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Abstract Prompted by approval in 1997 of troglitazone
and bromfenac, two drugs that promptly began to show
serious and sometimes fatal liver toxicity, we began at the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) a series of annual
conferences in 1999 to consider issues of drug-induced
liver injury (DILI). First inviting reviewers of new drug
applications we opened the audiences in 2001 to pharma-
ceutical industry and academic consultants to industry and
FDA, and slides shown at the meetings were posted on the
internet to be available at the website of the American
Association for the Study of Liver Diseases (AASLD)–go
to (http://www.aasld.org/dili/Pages/default.aspx). Obser-
vations by Dr. Hyman J. Zimmerman that ‘‘drug-induced
hepatocellular jaundice is a serious lesion’’ with possible
mortality formed a basis for developing a computer pro-
gram to plot peak serum values for alanine aminotrans-
ferase (ALT) and total bilirubin (TBL) in an x–y log–log
graph for all subjects enrolled in clinical trials. This pro-
gram had the capability to show the time course of all liver
tests for individuals who had both hepatocellular injury and
reduced whole liver function, plus clinical narratives to
diagnose the severity and most likely cause of the abnor-
malities. We called the program eDISH (for evaluation of
Drug-Induced Serious Hepatotoxicity), and began in 2004
to use it to assess DILI in clinical trial subjects. From 2008,
comments made by the presenters at the conferences about
their slides and ensuing discussions have been added to the
website. All this has raised awareness of the problem, and
since 1997, the FDA has not had to withdraw a single drug
because of post-marketing hepatotoxicity. Many issues still
remain to be resolved; among the most controversial is the
best method to estimate likelihood that a given liver injury
was actually caused by the drug in question. On November
9, 2012, a workshop was convened to discuss the best
practices for the assessment of drug-induced liver injury
(DILI) in clinical trials.
Key Points
Severity of liver injury cannot be determined by
ALT elevations alone, and receiver-operating
characteristic values often fail for very rare events
DILI cannot be diagnosed by serum chemistries
alone, nor by liver biopsy, but requires pertinent
clinical information
A new biomarker will have to be extremely specific
to be useful, and a better method is needed to
estimate if a given liver injury was caused by the
drug
1 Introduction
Timely detection and proper assessment of drug-induced
liver injury (DILI) in clinical trials has been for decades
one of the key safety challenges for both pharmaceutical
industry and regulatory authorities.
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A workshop was sponsored and organized jointly by the
European Innovative Medicines Initiative and The Hamner
Institute for Drug Safety Sciences, with the aim of
addressing gaps in current guidance and initiating align-
ment of liver safety assessment on a global scale.
On November 9, 2012, regulatory experts from the
FDA, European Medicines Agency, Health Canada, and
the Japanese National Institute of Health Sciences, with
representatives from industry and academia, convened in
Boston and discussed what could be considered best
practices in clinical liver safety assessment, focusing on
four key areas: 1) data elements and data standards, 2)
methodologies to systematically analyze liver safety data,
3) tools and methods for causality assessment, and 4) liver
safety assessment in special populations such as hepatitis
and oncology patients.
This section summarizes the Evolution of the Food
and Drug Administration Approach to Liver Safety
Assessment for New Drugs: the current status and
challenges. This brief historical note is written from the
perspective of an academic gastroenterologist who has
had a special interest in liver disorders (25 years), plus
pharmaceutical industry experience in work on gaining
approval for new drugs (16 years), and who has been
employed (19 years) as a gastrointestinal medical
reviewer and consultant in hepatology at the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). It is not intended to be a
comprehensive review of the subject of drug-induced
liver injury, nor an attempt to resolve still-controversial
issues in the field.
2 Current Status
2.1 Safety Withdrawals for New Molecular Entities
Approved by FDA in 1997
In 1997, several drugs were approved by the FDA that
generated criticism [1] because they appeared to cause
serious, sometimes fatal injury to vital organs such as the
liver, heart and skeletal muscle (Table 1).
Of special hepatological interest were two new drugs,
troglitazone and bromfenac, approved in January and July
1997. Troglitazone [2] was the first thiazolidinedione for
treatment of type-2 diabetes mellitus; bromfenac [3] was
just another non-steroidal analgesic drug for pain relief.
Both of these new drugs rather promptly began to cause
serious liver injury, liver failure, and death in patients [4,
5]. Bromfenac was withdrawn from the US market in June
1998; troglitazone had been taken off the market in the UK
in 1997 [6] but not until May 2000 in the US [7] after two
alternative thiazolidinedione agents, rosiglitazone and
pioglitazone, were approved.
2.2 Office of Post-Marketing Drug Risk Assessment
(OPDRA)
The Center for Drug Evaluation and Research established
in 1998 an Office of Post-Marketing Drug Risk Assessment
(OPDRA), and published a response to critical press
comments [8]. The new OPDRA, focused on drug safety,
was intended to evaluate reports of adverse drug effects
after marketing of new drugs, when greater numbers of
patients were treated than had been studied in clinical tri-
als. Spontaneous, voluntary reports to the Adverse Events
Reporting System (AERS) had been usually made first by
prescribing physicians reporting to the company sponsor of
the drug that an adverse effect had been noted in a patient
receiving it, after which reports were forwarded by the
sponsor to the Food and Drug Administration. Large
numbers of reports accumulated and required development
of new statistical analyses for observed associations [9].
However, the information content in most of the AERS
reports was insufficient to determine accurately either the
clinical severity of the adverse effect or its most likely
cause.
2.3 FDA Annual Educational Conferences on Drug-
induced Liver Injury
Stimulated by adverse liver effects of these new drugs, we
proposed in the summer of 1998 that an educational course
Table 1 Safety withdrawals for new molecular entities approved by FDA in 1997
New drug Date approved Date withdrawn Reason for withdrawal
Troglitazone 29 Jan 1997 21 Mar 2000 Liver toxicity
Mibefradil 20 Jun 1997 8 Jun 1998 Fatal arrhythmias
Cerivastatin 26 Jun 1997 8 Aug 2001 Rhabdomyolysis, renal failure
Bromfenac 15 Jul 1997 22 Jun 1998 Severe hepatitis, liver failure
Sibutramine 22 Nov 1997 8 Oct 2010 Risk of heart attack, stroke
Trovafloxacin 18 Dec 1997 16 Jun 2006 Liver toxicity
Alatrofloxacin 18 Dec 1997 16 Jun 2006 Liver toxicity
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be prepared for FDA reviewers on the interplay of the liver
functions and drug effects, called ‘‘Drugs and the Liver:
What They Do to Each Other.’’ A course outline was
developed, and we sought advice about it from an esteemed
consultant in the emerging field of drug-induced hepato-
toxicity, Dr. Hyman J. Zimmerman. He supported and
encouraged it and offered to speak. We obtained permis-
sion to offer the course, announcing it in September 1998.
In April 1999, about 325 FDA reviewers attended the two-
day course at the University of Maryland campus at Shady
Grove Conference Center, with support and participation
by CDER leadership. Dr. Zimmerman developed health
problems and asked Dr. James Lewis to present his mate-
rial, but he was able to attend the conference, his last public
appearance before his death in July 1999. An eponymic
appellation [10], ‘‘Hy’s Law,’’ was put forth there by Dr.
Robert Temple of the FDA, to which Dr. Zimmerman
objected, but he did agree with the principle. First stated in
his 1968 Kober Lecture [11] at Georgetown University, his
observation was repeated in both editions of his texts of
1978 and 1999: ‘‘drug-induced hepatocellular jaundice
is a serious lesion,’’ with mortality ranging from 10 to
50 %. A short course for 75 more reviewers was given in
November 1999. This educational approach has been
continued with a series of annual conferences on drug-
induced liver injury (DILI), the 14th of which was held in
March 2014 (slides and verbatim text of comments avail-
able on the internet http://www.AASLD.org under the
header Training/Education).
In January 2000, the author began working in the new
OPDRA, devoting full time to responding to consultation
requests from the medical review divisions of the Office
of New Drugs on cases of possible DILI detected in
clinical trials of drugs under review for approval. In
2001, OPDRA was renamed the Office of Drug Safety, in
2003, renamed the Office of Pharmacoepidemiology and
Statistical Science (OPaSS), and in 2006, the Office of
Surveillance and Epidemiology (OSE). Over the 13 years
since, scores of requests for consultation about possible
drug-induced liver toxicity have been received and
answered. These consultation requests have been diffi-
cult, challenging, nearly always concerning a new drug
compound never before heard of, for treating a disorder
of which little or nothing was known by the author,
asking for a learned reply rapidly. Medical literature,
Google searches, discussions with experts, whatever was
needed, were used to understand the problem, obtain and
examine the data available, then give explanations and
recommendations. These consultation responses were
confidential, intended for the review division staff and
other FDA/CDER staff only. They were not published
openly, and were not circulated outside the Agency. The
learning process led to recording, sharing, and teaching
what had been learned, and to seeking additional ideas
and reactions from others, forming the basis for the
annual public DILI conferences mentioned above.
2.4 Causality of the Observed Effect
Primary among the key elements of the Zimmerman dic-
tum was the concept of causality of the observed effect as
drug-induced, rather than caused by viral infection, alcohol
or other drug overdose, autoimmune effects, or many
alternative possible causes. It was recognized that DILI
could mimic almost any other known form of liver disease,
could not be diagnosed accurately even by liver biopsy and
histologic interpretation, had no biomarker that could be
relied upon confidently, and serious DILI was a rare
occurrence from approved drugs. The diagnosis of DILI
became a diagnosis of exclusion, arrived at by a series of
studies and interrogations to exclude other possible causes
of the findings. This process of medical differential diag-
nosis is an art for which physicians are trained and become
experienced and skillful. The difficulty of determining the
probable cause of abnormal liver test findings of ‘‘drug-
induced hepatic injury’’ was pointed out by Popper and
Schaffner [12] a decade earlier than the Zimmerman
observation.
2.5 eDISH
The Hy’s Law principle then formed the basis for the
FDA’s development of a software program called
‘‘eDISH’’ (for evaluation of drug-induced serious hepato-
toxicity). The program was written in a language called
SASIntrNet by an insightful and open-minded expert stat-
istician, Dr. Ted Guo. It allowed scanning of large numbers
of patients from clinical trials for indicators of hepatocel-
lular injury by serum alanine aminotransferase (ALT)
activity and of whole liver dysfunction by total bilirubin
(TBL) concentration. These biomarkers were routinely
measured in almost all clinical trials, usually with serial
values obtained according to protocol. For the first step in
the eDISH analysis, data from case reports for all patients
or subjects enrolled in a trial were surveyed for peak values
of ALT and TBL over their entire period of observation.
See Fig. 1.
They were plotted on an x–y chart as logarithm10 values
of multiples of elevations above the upper limits of the
normal reference ranges (9ULN), to bring the much
greater fluctuations of ALT than TBL into a corresponding
scale, yet preserve their magnitudes. For conservative
purposes, to preserve sensitivity of detecting nearly all
cases, low cut-off levels were employed: 39ULN for ALT
and 29ULN for TBL. Using data from all of the subjects or
patients in a clinical trial, peak values for ALT and TBL
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are plotted as a planar x–y graph, with ALT abscissa values
and ordinate TBL values, each point representing a single
person.
Shown in Fig. 1, is an eDISH plot for almost 4,000
patients enrolled in a trial of an experimental new drug
(X) and a control agent (C), 1960 randomized to X, 1962 to
C. The cut-off lines then make four quadrants: a lower left
quadrant contains most patients with normal or near normal
peak values for both variables; an upper left quadrant that
contains those with elevated bilirubin levels but not much
ALT elevation; a lower right quadrant showing those with
elevated ALTs but not TBLs, indicating hepatocellular
injury without whole liver dysfunction; and a few patients
in the right upper quadrant who showed clinically signifi-
cant hepatocellular injury AND whole liver dysfunction by
elevations of both, not necessarily on the same test day.
Cut-off levels were not established by data analyses, but
were based on expert opinions at a Fogarty International
Conference in 1978 that concluded [13] that ALT values
[39ULN and TBL[29ULN were ‘‘markedly abnormal.’’
No adjustment was made for the general practice that each
local laboratory establishes its own ranges of normal val-
ues, with variance in such reference ranges. The cutoff lines
do not mean that those in the upper right quadrant can be
called ‘‘Hy’s Law’’ cases, but only that they are identified
as patients of special interest for which more clinical
information should be sought for medical diagnosis of the
most likely cause of the findings. The usefulness of the
eDISH program has been appreciated by many pharma-
ceutical companies and widely copied, at least for the step-
one x–y log–log plot of ALT and TBL, especially with the
encouragement of some of their principal consultants.[14]
The second step of the eDISH program (Fig. 2) is
activated by pointing to and clicking on a symbol on the
first x–y plot, which brings up the time course of ALT,
TBL, plus aspartate aminotransferase (AST) and alkaline
phosphatase (ALP) for that single patient over the time of
observation, all four variables plotted together for easy
visual comparison. It can be noted at a glance if the bili-
rubin elevation preceded or followed the rise in ALT or
AST, and when there were notable changes in serum
chemistry test values. In the case selected above (the single
green circle on the first x–y plot indicating randomization
to control drug, warfarin), the time course and clinical
narrative revealed that the patient had undiagnosed pan-
creatic carcinoma, very unlikely to have been caused by
warfarin, and fatal to the patient a short time later. In
responding to many consultation requests, we have found it
useful to request data from the sponsor on all liver tests
done during clinical trials, including those from local lab-
oratories, for all subjects or patients in selected and pivotal
clinical studies, in eDISH format as specified by Dr. Guo.
Many companies have copied the first eDISH plot with
programs for their own use.
For diagnosis of DILI or some other cause, the time
course is greatly augmented by a medical text narrative
about that person, as eDISH step three. They should be
written by a physician skilled in medical differential
diagnosis, to estimate the most likely cause of the abnor-
mal findings and clinical picture, and to make an assess-
ment of the probability that it was drug-induced or not. It is
seldom possible to be absolutely certain that the findings
were caused by the drug and not by something else. That is
still a medical art. If there are several possible causes, and
there usually are, it is not enough simply to conclude that a
case is thought to be ‘‘confounded;’’ they nearly all are.
Protocols do not always anticipate adverse effects; simple
case report forms may not be useful in diagnosing cau-
sality. We take an estimated likelihood as ‘‘probable’’ if
[50 % likely, more than all other causes combined, If
Peak TBL vs. Peak ALT
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Fig. 1 A step-one eDISH plot
of almost 4,000 randomized
patients. ALT alanine
aminotransferase, TBL total
bilirubin, eDISH evaluation of
drug-induced serious
hepatotoxicity, ULRR upper
limit of reference range or
normal
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information provided is sufficient, and the patient has been
well investigated to rule out alternative causal possibilities.
We may be able to raise the likelihood level to [75 %,
‘‘very likely,’’ or[95 %, ‘‘almost certain,’’ with additional
medical information. For less well supported diagnoses, we
have taken [25 to 50 % as ‘‘possible,’’ 5 to 25 % as
‘‘unlikely’’, and \5 % as ‘‘very unlikely.’’ Admittedly,
these are not exact determinations but are clinical estimates
based on the skill and experience of the rater and quality of
the information provided.
It is clear that correct diagnosis cannot be made by
serum chemistry abnormalities alone. The use of the term
‘‘biochemical Hy’s Law’’ reflects profound misunder-
standing of the purpose and use of eDISH, but is a term all
too commonly mis-used by company statisticians for
screening new drugs in development. We avoid terms
saying adverse findings were ‘‘associated with’’ or even
‘‘related to’’ the drug, but mean that the term ‘‘drug-
induced’’ indicates at least probably caused by the drug,
not by something else.
Is this distinction important? It certainly is, for what we
are seeking to find is usually rare, on the order of 1 per
1,000 to 10,000 who are exposed to the drug suspected. For
rare events, test sensitivity is far less important than high
specificity. A test or biomarker to detect abnormal states is
very dependent upon the prevalence or incidence of the
abnormality sought. We seek to find, as early as possible
before drug-induced injury is irreversible, serious DILI
that causes disability, requires hospitalization, and leads to
acute liver failure, death or liver transplantation. We are
less concerned with serum aminotransferase elevations that
are transient, asymptomatic, not accompanied or followed
by degradation in liver functions such as clearance of bil-
irubin or synthesis of prothrombin. The liver is a remark-
able organ, capable of regeneration even when 65 % of it is
destroyed or resected, able to adapt and become tolerant of
xenobiotic agents, and of variable genetic ability to tolerate
new drugs. Only rare persons are unable to tolerate or to
adapt to the new drug. This is not a statistical but a medical
problem; the statistical ‘‘outlier’’ is the medical patient of
interest who needs investigation to find out what is causing
the abnormal findings before it is too late.
This concept of setting grades for elevations of serum
enzyme activities was established in 1983 when the
National Cancer Institute (NCI) of the United States
National Institutes of Health (NIH) first published their
Common Toxicity Criteria (CTC) for adverse events.
Results of laboratory chemistry tests, physical findings, and
indicators were included, based on opinions of experts or
committees. The CTC assessed serum enzyme elevations
as grade 1, mild ([ULN to 2.59ULN); grade 2, moderate
([2.59ULN to 59ULN); grade 3, severe ([59ULN to
209ULN); and grade 4, life-threatening ([209ULN).
These have been updated periodically; version 3 changed
the name in 2006 to the Common Terminology Criteria for
Adverse Events (CTCAE), and version 4 in 2009, modified
the cut-off between mild and moderate ALT and AST
elevations from 2.5 to 39ULN. The CTCAE are widely
used and followed by oncologists and other disciplines
[15].
Test results are usually interpreted as either ‘‘positive’’
or negative. Determination of what may be the optimal cut-
off value is critical. High sensitivity to detect the disease by
positive results and not miss many is important, as is high
specificity so that normal people without disease show
negative test results. In the real world, no test is perfect.
The trade-off must be endured: more sensitivity for less
specificity, or the reverse. This idea was captured bril-
liantly by the popular receiver-operating characteristic
(ROC) curves emerging from World War II detection by
radar signals of enemy planes approaching, then developed
for medical use [16] in psychology, then radiology, and
recently more generally in medicine as a convincing way to
evaluate test results or ‘‘signals.’’ For ROC curves, test
sensitivity is plotted on the ordinate and unspecificity (1 -
specificity) on the abscissa, so what is being examined is
Time Course of Liver Tests
































Fig. 2 The time course of liver
tests
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the true positive versus false positive test results. Such
ROC curves have become a widely used to ‘‘validate’’ new
tests, but too often this neglects a critical third element:
incidence, or prevalence, which must be appreciated. Let
us assume that a new test or biomarker has perfect 100 %
sensitivity, detecting all cases being sought and missing
none, with impressive specificity of 95 %, showing only
uncommon false positive results, but applied to detecting a
relatively rare (1 per 1,000) problem. For new-onset liver
injury caused by a drug, usually a relatively rare event,
incidence of 1/1,000 is not uncommon, and serious cases
are often even less frequently seen. Because the great
majority, almost all, people do not show DILI, the value of
positive results is low (see Table 2).
If we use our new test on 100,000 persons to detect a
disorder with an incidence of 1 per 1,000, please note the
requirement for high specificity to avoid overwhelming the
true positive results with false positives. It is obvious from
this that even a test or biomarker with perfect sensitivity
and high specificity allows correct interpretations from
positive test results in less than 2 % of them, so that more
than 98 % are wrong, if looking for a rare problem! Pursuit
of diagnoses by investigative work-ups in all the[98 % of
patients tested with false positive results has raised costs of
assessing approved drugs, and has also defeated routine
monitoring attempts for many years. Both patients and
physicians grow weary of repeatedly negative test results,
and soon quit trying. To be [90 % correct would require
test specificity of 99.99 %. Such specifications for bio-
markers are unheard of, and it is extremely difficult to
show such values of sensitivity and specificity for candi-
date biomarkers proposed as ‘‘better’’ than the combination
of {ALT[39ULN & TBL[29ULN}. Time-course and
narrative data, as used in the eDISH approach, sharpen
differential diagnosis even more, and provide the very high
specificity needed.
The ‘‘values’’ of positive and negative test results [17]
are often referred to as ‘‘positive predictive values, PPV,’’
or ‘‘negative predictive values, NPV,’’ and NPVs are
sometimes cited as evidence of how good a test may be.
This is grossly erroneous, and is an example of misun-
derstanding that still needs to be corrected. The values may
indicate what has happened to date, but not what will
happen. However, use of serial values to establish trends
over time may be helpful. Rather than referring to the tests
results as ‘‘predictive,’’ it would be preferable to call them
indicative or diagnostic.
Whether the educational efforts and national confer-
ences have raised awareness about DILI problems, or
whether increasing use of eDISH approach by sponsors and
reviewers have had an impact, the FDA has not approved
any drug since the end of 1997 that later had to be taken off
the market because of serious hepatotoxicity. This should
be viewed from the perspective [18] of the 740 new drugs
approved by FDA in the three decades from 1980 through
2009 of which 118 (16 %) had been withdrawn as of
December 2010, but only 31/118 (26 %) for safety reasons.
As noted, 1997 was an especially bad year for drug
approvals later withdrawn for safety problems, four
because of liver toxicity, two for cardiac, and one for
skeletal muscle injury (Table 1).
‘‘Withdrawals’’ may be affected by FDA rescinding of
approvals, but more often are done by sponsors who vol-
untarily stop marketing the drug because of adverse
reports, but may vary widely between market availability
and regulatory action. The seven drugs in Table 1 were
withdrawn after varying delays. Trovafloxacin hepatotox-
icity was first noted in 1998 but not published [19, 20] until
2000, and it was not officially withdrawn until 2006, so
was not included in the initial course for reviewers.
The present approach of responses to consultations
going directly to the review divisions considering new
drugs for approval, with the Office of Surveillance and
Epidemiology also being notified, seems to have been
effective in contributing to the prevention of serious DILI.
It may supplement the larger efforts on data mining and
screening of large numbers of voluntary, spontaneous
reports to the AERS system for detecting adverse effects of
marketed drugs after they have occurred. It seems better to
prevent approval of new drugs that show indications of
possibly serious liver toxicity in clinical trial data, than to
discover it later after approval and marketing. The quality
of clinical data for assessing severity and, more impor-
tantly, probable causality, of adverse liver effects requires
the more complete data from clinical trials.
3 Current Challenges in Assessing Liver Safety
of Drugs: What is the Way Forward?
It is appropriate to ask what current challenges exist and
how this record may be improved. We do not yet have
Table 2 Key importance of specificity when screening for rare
events
Test result DILI No DILI Totals Value
Positive 100 (TP) 4,995 (FP) 5,095 0.0196
Negative 0 (FN) 94,905 (TN) 94,005 1.0000
100 99,900 100,000
Incidence Sensitivity Specificity Accuracy
1 per 1,000 100 % 95 % 95.0 %
DILI drug-induced liver injury, the disease sought, TP true positive
test result, FN false negative test result, FP false positive test result,
TN true negative test result
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biomarkers that are specific enough to surpass medical
differential diagnosis. If a liver injury is probably drug-
induced, affects enough hepatocytes that the whole organ is
not able to clear plasma of bilirubin so jaundice occurs, and
not mainly cholestatic, Temple found that the Zimmerman
rule was just about always correct, that is, very highly
specific, if probably caused by the drug. A challenge
remains that expert hepatological judgment is often needed
to diagnose DILI convincingly, with considerable variance
in the judgments, even among experts. The several hepa-
tologists of the NIH-supported drug-induced liver injury
network (DILIN) have struggled with this for eight years
but have no better alternative, and still cannot agree [21]
upon the reliability of the RUCAM (Roussel-Uclaf Cau-
sality Assessment Method), an algorithmic process [22, 23]
proposed in 1993 and used widely in Europe and elsewhere
in the world [24]. It is also recognized that exact diagnosis
of causality cannot be made by liver biopsy, although
useful information about the state of the liver can be
learned [25].
It was also observed by Temple that drugs which caused
a marked preponderance of lesser liver injuries compared
to control agents, shown by more frequent serum amino-
transferases, were more likely also to show more Hy’s Law
cases, so the right lower quadrant of the eDISH x–y plot
was dubbed by me as ‘‘Temple’s Corollary.’’ It needs to be
emphasized that simple elevations of ALT are not serious if
not followed or accompanied by any liver dysfunctional
effects such as hospitalization, inability to work, jaundice,
prolonged prothrombin time, secondary kidney failure or
brain obtundation. They are frequently handled by adap-
tation of that person’s liver so it becomes tolerant of the
drug, and the injury does not progress to serious dysfunc-
tion. This occurs in a great majority of patients who show
some initial elevation of ALT activities when the person is
first exposed to a new drug. The rate of injury worsening is
a concern, because no practical monitoring program can be
expected to detect liver injuries that become irreversible
within one monitoring interval, such as a month as shown
by a few drugs such as troglitazone, telithromycin, and a
few others.
A helpful step forward might be to get rid of incorrect
and misleading terminology when we discuss these issues.
The term ‘‘liver function tests’’ is commonly applied to
measurements of serum enzyme activities, such as ALT,
AST, ALP, and others; this is wrong, because those tests do
not measure any function of the liver whatsoever. Serum
enzymes such as ALT may come from many tissues, not
just the liver, and are well known to be quite unspecific,
although fairly sensitive indicators of the rate and extent of
hepatocellular injury. Only the TBL and INR, but not
enzymes, are included in the MELD (model for end-stage
liver disease) used to determine when overall liver function
is compromised sufficiently to require liver transplantation
to avoid death from liver failure [26]. The scoring system,
originally developed at Mayo Clinic, has stood the test of
time for over 20 years, although minor fine-tuning has been
suggested [27].
Another term that should be relegated to the waste
basket is ‘‘Hy’s Law chemistries,’’ often seen in regulatory
submissions, developed and used wrongly by some com-
pany statisticians to ‘‘diagnose’’ Hy’s Law simply by not-
ing peak values of {ALT[29ULN AND TBL[29ULN} on
the step-one eDISH-like plot. The eDISH program was not
designed for use as a statistical tool, but was developed for
clinical reviewers who could exercise skills in medical
differential diagnosis to arrive at the most likely or prob-
able cause of the abnormal findings, not necessarily DILI.
We are currently working on an update of the program as
‘‘eDISH2’’ and initiating steps to make it publicly available
as a government invention.
Another example of unfortunate terminology used by
the NCI Common Terminology Criteria for Adverse Events
is ‘‘life-threatening’’ for serum enzyme elevations
[209ULN. A vast amount of eDISH data show that such
elevations of ALT are not life-threatening, are often
asymptomatic, not necessarily predictive of serious hepa-
totoxicity, and misleading. The CTCAE to date have been
based only upon expert opinions or committee votes, but
not on analyses of real data. That can now be corrected by
simply looking at and analyzing the vast amount of clinical
trial data now in the archives of the FDA, from accumu-
lations of many clinical trials over decades. Those data
have been used for regulatory decisions, but not for the
wealth of information they might yield if resources were
made available to use the data for clinical research.
There is still a wide gulf of misunderstanding between
many basic scientists and clinicians on the interpretation of
test results. This is understandable because of the uniquely
special training and experience of medical students, train-
ees, and practitioners in the art of medical differential
diagnosis of probable causality, a skill not taught to or
usually learned by chemists, pharmacologists, toxicolo-
gists, and statisticians. Those basic scientists have had
great success in developing ever more effective methods to
screen for drugs likely to cause hepatotoxicity in various
tests systems in vitro and in animals. Finding potentially
dangerous drugs, however, is only half the problem. The
other half: drugs that appear to be reasonably safe in pre-
clinical studies still may be harmful to some few patients
who receive them. There are limits to how large and long
controlled clinical trials can be, because of the enormous
costs involved. Those necessarily limited clinical trials
cannot be expected to discover the rare patients who react
differently than most to new drugs, and who are susceptible
to sustaining progressive liver injury and dysfunction from
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the drug if it is continued too long and they are unable to
develop tolerance by liver adaptation. There is no present
way to identify whom those rare persons may be other than
by careful, serial observation. There still is no magic bio-
marker to identify them. This is the medical side of the
problem, and needs to be solved by clinicians who under-
stand it, not depending on preclinical scientists to come up
with easier methods.
A final suggestion for consideration by readers of this
review is for a possible alternative to the conventional
approval of a new drug as ‘‘safe’’ or disapproval as ‘‘not
safe.’’ That simplistic idea does not take into consider-
ation that there are many degrees of safety problems
affecting the liver, from transient, asymptomatic, non-
progressive increases in serum enzyme activity to the
most blatant form of rapid liver failure and death or need
for transplantation. Different efficacy is also seen, and not
all patients show the same amount of benefit from a new
drug. One dose does not necessarily fit all, despite it
being easier to market if that is accepted. We all hope
that the new drug will cause more benefits than harms in
those receiving it, terms too often used loosely and
qualitatively. A more exact quantitative evaluation
requires learning of how many users will show how much
benefit or harm, how soon and how likely the effects are
attributable to the drug and not to natural process or other
causes. Chances of benefits should exceed risks or harms
if a new drug is to be useful. The quantitative use of
benefits and harms should always be expressed as a dif-
ference and never as a ratio. The mis-used term benefit/
risk ratio, or its inverse, do not take into consideration
that some drugs have no risk (zero) in many people, or
that the drug may show no benefit (zero) in some patients.
Division by zero gives an infinite or indeterminate value,
and should not be used.
Controlled clinical trials in large numbers of subjects,
often for some years, are exceedingly costly in money
spent and time off-patent consumed. Is there perhaps some
alternative within the law and regulations that might permit
learning more about a new drug when clinical trial data
raise some suspicion of possible rare toxicity, or the drug is
a member of a dangerous class of drugs? This issue
deserves more thinking, debate, and work toward a solu-
tion. It is not enough just to hope-for-the-best and depend
on post-marketing surveillance to discover the truth. It
remains better to prevent such occurrences before they
occur, or to devise ways to detect oncoming serious drug-
induced injuries by close observation of treated patients
and intervention before the injuries become irreversible.
We have attempted to summarize many of the key con-
siderations in the FDA Guidance of July 2009 [28] that all
are encouraged to read very carefully, and that will be
revised and updated from time to time.
4 Conclusion
Our thinking about detection, evaluation, and prevention of
serious DILI has evolved greatly over the 15 years since
the first conference was planned in the summer of 1998.
The many thoughtful contributions of scores of participants
at our annual conferences have been very much appreci-
ated, with the expectation that they will continue.
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